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Infroduction
OR over 80 years, New York lived under a penal law created for the late
19th century. It was kept up to date by individual additions and subtractions which rarely had any relationship to each other and never to any rational
overall scheme. As a result, our penal law was a mass of inconsistencies,
archaisms, and irrationalities, with gaps and redundancies.
New York, of course, was not alone in this situation, and by the same
token, New York is not the only state which is reforming its law. Indeed, New
York's effort is part of what may fairly be called a great wave of penal law
reform. Stimulated by the Model Penal Code of the American Law Institute,
over half the states have recently undertaken revision of their penal codes.
Among them all, New York's revision may well be the moft significant. Not
only is New York law generally looked to by other states, but the New York effort is probably the best-financed, and one of the few, if not the only one, with a
full-time professional staff. This highly competent and experienced staff, under
the leadership of chairman Richard Bartlett of the Temporary Commission and
of Staff Director Richard Denzer, has put together a code which will probably
be a model for many other states. Hopefully, the interviews and articles in this
Symposium will be of use to others undertaking such reforms.
It should of course be understood that the substantive reforms are not
radical: gambling, drug use, homosexuality, and similar victimless offenses are
rationalized and restructured, but not really changed; New York's penalties remain extremely harsh; the Code still contains dubiously constitutional vagrancy
provisions, now renamed loitering,' which afford numerous opportunities for
police abuse and harassment. 2
On the other hand, there are some quite significant improvements. The
General Part contains a presumption against strict liability for misdemeanors
and felonies; there is a good deal more flexibility in sentencing, and the barbaric Baumes law, which mandated heavy sentences for habitual felons regardless of the individual circumstances, has been replaced by a provision allowing
the judge wide discretion; conspiracy has been limited to conspiracies to commit
a felony or misdemeanor. Several other attempts by the Commission at improvement were either defeated in the legislature-e.g., the attempt to repeal the
prohibitions on adultery and on consensual adult homosexuality-or repealed
after enactment-e.g., the justification provisions.
The Commission's failures in these and other areas indicate part of the
reason why a more thoroughgoing substantive reform was not achieved or even
attempted. Another reason may be that at least part of the fundamental rethinking, primarily in the General Part, was accomplished through use of the
Model Penal Code as a substantive guideline. One cannot help wondering, however, whether greater participation by academic lawyers and sociologists might
1. See N.Y. Penal Law § 240.35 (6) and § 240.35 (9) (McKinney 1967).
2. See W. LaFave, Arrest 354-60 (1965); P. Chevigny, Police Power 209, 222-35 (1969).
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not have provided perspectives and outlooks not usually common among those
who spend their lives in the day-to-day process. Of course, Columbia's Professor
Herbert Wechsler was on the Commission, but that is not quite the same as
having academic lawyers and sociologists steadily working with the staff on a
daily basis.
It is nevertheless unlikely that political reality would have permitted more
thoroughgoing reform. This may be a permanent situation and perhaps this is
as it should be--many of the desired reforms are highly controversial and a
package proposal may prevent adequate consideration of the individual provisions. Indeed, the Commission itself acted on this assumption in several ways:
the insanity defense, consensual homosexuality and a few other controversial
issues, like the right to resist an unlawful arrest, were presented separately,
and their defeat did not endanger the rest of the package. On the other hand,
when the clamor for a change in the justification provisions made it clear that
legislation was inevitable, the Commission tried again with a provision prohibiting resistance to an unlawful arrest and this time it went through as part
of a bigger package.
Where then can we expect really significant substantive law reform? As
things stand at the moment, it depends on the subject: abortion reform may
be legislatively achieved; other changes are however less likely. It may well
be that in substantive criminal law, as in procedural law, the most significant
hope for real change is with the courts, particularly the Supreme Court. So far
the Court has tended to neglect substantive criminal law except for a few cases
like Robinson v. California,3 Griswold v. Connecticut,4 and Trop v. Dulles.6 If
the Court will extend the due process and cruel and unusual punishment clauses
of the Constitution to some of the gross injustices of our substantive law, like the
current penalties for marijuana possession, capital punishment, and our grossly
discriminatory gambling laws, truly fundamental reform of the substantive
criminal law may result in the same way that it has in the procedural area.
Until that day, however, we must be grateful for what we have, and in
the new Penal Law we have quite a lot-a rational, quite clear, easy to use,
extremely well-drafted body of law, with some quite meaningful changes. Until
the legislature starts to pick away at it-as it must if penal law is to keep pace
with a changing society-this is a law with which we can all comfortably work.
If we can somehow survive the community's current tendency to think the
answer to social problems is more and higher criminal penalties-a perhaps predictable reaction by a violent society to something it can neither manage nor
even understand-a future commission to revise the Penal Law may be able
to undertake a more fundamental revision of the substantive law.
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3. 370 U.S. 660 (1960).
4. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).

5. 365 U.s. 86 (1958).

